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Abstract Stakeholder theory posits that accountability systems depend on the
strength and the number of their stakeholders. This paper aims to analyze the
empirical validity of stakeholder theory, focusing on accountability systems in
the museum sector. Based on Wikipedia resources, we have selected all of the
‘‘National Museums’’ (134 museums) in the major developed countries: Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the US. After we control
for type of activity (art or other), cost per visitor and country, the results of an OLS
multivariate model show that size of the museum, which is assumed to represent the
strength and number of stakeholders, and the amount of funds received, which
represents the power of a particularly salient category of stakeholders (donors), are
the two main determinants of the accountability level. We conclude that account-
ability, in the absence of shareholders, is driven by the number and the power of
different stakeholders, validating the stakeholder theory.
Re´sume´ Le postulat de la the´orie des parties prenantes est que les syste`mes de
responsabilite´ de´pendent de la puissance et du nombre de leurs parties prenantes.
Cet article a vocation a` analyser la validite´ empirique de la the´orie des parties
prenantes, en s’inte´ressant aux syste`mes de responsabilite´ dans le secteur des
muse´es. Nous basant sur des ressources Wikipedia, nous avons se´lectionne´ tous
les « Muse´es nationaux » (134 muse´es) dans les principaux pays de´veloppe´s :
Australie, Canada, France, Allemagne, Italie, le Royaume-Uni et les USA. Apre`s un
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controˆle par type d’activite´ (art ou autre), couˆt par visiteur et pays, les re´sultats d’un
mode`le multivariable MCO (Moindres Carre´s Ordinaires) indiquent que la taille du
muse´e, dont on suppose qu’elle repre´sente la puissance et le nombre des parties
prenantes, et le volume des fonds rec¸us, qui illustre la puissance d’une cate´gorie
particulie`rement remarquable de parties prenantes (donateurs), sont les deux
de´terminants principaux du niveau de responsabilite´. Nous concluons que la
responsabilite´, en l’absence d’actionnaires, est de´termine´e par le nombre et la
puissance des diffe´rentes parties prenantes, validant ainsi la the´orie des parties
prenantes.
Zusammenfassung Die Stakeholder-Theorie unterstellt, dass Rechenschaftssys-
teme von der Sta¨rke und Zahl ihrer Stakeholder abha¨ngig sind. Ziel des vorlie-
genden Beitrags ist es, die empirische Gu¨ltigkeit der Stakeholder-Theorie zu
untersuchen, wobei wir uns hier auf die Rechenschaftssysteme im Museumssektor
konzentrieren. Beruhend auf Wikipedia-Quellen haben wir sa¨mtliche ‘‘National-
museen’’ (134 Museen) aus den wichtigsten Industriela¨ndern ausgewa¨hlt: Austra-
lien, Kanada, Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien, Großbritannien und den USA. Nach
Pru¨fung der Ta¨tigkeit (Kunst oder Sonstiges), der Kosten pro Besucher und des
Landes zeigen die Ergebnisse eines multivariaten Modells nach der gewo¨hnlichen
Kleinstquadrate-Methode (ordinary least squares, OLS), dass die Museumsgro¨ße,
von der angenommen wird, dass sie die Sta¨rke und Zahl der Stakeholder darstellt,
und die Ho¨he der erhaltenen Gelder, die die Einflusssta¨rke einer speziell her-
vorgehobenen Stakeholder-Kategorie (Spender) repra¨sentiert, die zwei wesentlichen
Bestimmungsgro¨ßen fu¨r das Rechenschaftsmaß sind. Wir ziehen den Schluss, dass
die Rechenschaft, sofern keine Anteilseigner vorhanden sind, durch die Zahl und
Einflusssta¨rke verschiedener Stakeholder bestimmt wird. Die Stakeholder-Theorie
wird somit besta¨tigt.
Resumen La teorı´a de las partes interesadas postula que los sistemas de
responsabilidad dependen de la fortaleza y el nu´mero de sus partes interesadas. Este
documento tiene como objetivo analizar la validez empı´rica de la teorı´a de las partes
interesadas, centra´ndose en los sistemas de responsabilidad en el sector de los
museos. Basa´ndonos en recursos de Wikipedia, hemos seleccionado todos los
‘‘Museos Nacionales’’ (134 museos) en los principales paı´ses desarrollados: Aus-
tralia, Canada´, Francia, Alemania, Italia, Reino Unido y los Estados Unidos de
Ame´rica. Despue´s de controlar por tipo de actividad (arte u otro), coste por visitante
y paı´s, los resultados de un modelo multivariable OLS/MCO (mı´nimos cuadrados
ordinarios) muestran que el taman˜o del museo, que se asume que representa la
fortaleza y el nu´mero de partes interesadas, y la cantidad de fondos recibidos, que
representa el poder de una categorı´a particularmente sobresaliente de partes inte-
resadas (donantes), son los dos principales determinantes del nivel de respons-
abilidad. Concluimos que la responsabilidad, en ausencia de accionistas, es
impulsada por el nu´mero y el poder de las diferentes partes interesadas, validando la
teorı´a de las partes interesadas.
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Introduction
Stakeholder theory derives from Freeman (1984, p. 46), who defined a stakeholder
as ‘‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an
organization’s objectives.’’
This theory is concerned with how the power of stakeholders and their competing
interests are managed by the organization in terms of broader accountability. One
role of the board of directors and management is to create an appropriate balance
between these interests in overseeing an organization’s accountability systems
(Gray et al. 2006). In this regard, all the categories of stakeholders (internal and
external) are crucial and should be involved. On this point, Mitchell et al. (1997)
argue that the salience of stakeholders (e.g., the degree to which their arguments
were perceived to count) depended upon the stakeholder possessing three attributes:
power, legitimacy, and urgency. In concrete terms, the accountability system of
each organization is modeled following the different role, engagement, and
importance of each category of stakeholders. Because in non-profit organizations,
the audience of ‘‘salient’’ and strategic stakeholders is wider than in corporations—
in which shareholders are overriding stakeholders because of their prominent
ownership position—the accountability systems should take into the account this
higher complexity related to the heterogeneous expectations of each stakeholders’
category.
As described above, this paper aims to analyze the empirical validity of
stakeholder theory, which posits that accountability systems depend on the strength
and the number of stakeholders.
The particular contribution of this article to the scholarly discussion is to enhance
empirical knowledge concerning the levels of accountability of non-profit organi-
zations at an international level with particular reference to the museum sector. In
doing so, we hope to fill—at least to some extent—the research void in this field that
has existed so far (Najam 1996; Ebrahim 2005; Costa et al. 2011).
To this end, we study the field of non-profit organizations, specifically museums.
There are three main reasons for this choice.
First, the absence of shareholders in the traditional sense within non-profit
organizations makes stakeholder theory a viable perspective from which to
understand accountability to multiple stakeholders where power differentials in
capital and factor markets and in regulation mean that differing interests need to be
implicitly or explicitly prioritized (Collier 2008, p. 935; Mulgan 2000, p. 124).
Second, organizations need to ensure their long-term survival and success by
directly satisfying all stakeholders (Collier 2008; Woodward and Marshall 2004,
p. 124). Therefore, because institutional aims are at the basis of accountability
systems, multiple-stakeholder theory is stronger in this field.
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Finally, stakeholder theory offers organizations a way of identifying and
reconciling disparate stakeholder interests by recognizing organizational obligations
to wider and more ethically concerned constituencies (Simmons 2004).
In this study, we analyze a specific external accountability channel: web
communication. At this time, the web is the main tool for gathering information for
general stakeholders, and it is also the easiest to use (Sikka 2006; Gallhofer and
Haslam 2006). This capability is particularly important for multi-stakeholder
organizations. In the most general terms, ‘‘we might refer to a non-profit
organization’s web-based accountability practices as any online reporting, feedback,
and/or stakeholder input and engagement mechanisms that serve to demonstrate or
enhance accountability’’ (Saxton and Guo 2011).
The rapid diffusion of web technologies throughout the non-profit sector has
brought with it considerable potential for organizational change (McNutt and
Boland 1999; Schneider 2003; Hackler and Saxton 2007) and, more critical for our
current purposes, has helped create the framework for the emergence of a more
accountable era characterized by increasingly inclusive and transparent organiza-
tional practices (Benjamin 2008).
Internet-based technologies are increasingly providing citizens with the ability to
gain access to information they deem important. At the same time, these
technologies have led to an increased ability of organizations to disclose financial
and operational information. Through the use of interactive electronic networking
capabilities, this technology also facilitates stakeholder inclusion in organizational
decision-making by lowering participation costs. In short, with the diffusion of
Internet technology, there is both an increased need as well as ability to use the web
to address organizational accountability (Saxton and Guo 2011).
To our knowledge, no empirical study has analyzed the link between the number
and the power of different classes of stakeholders and web-based accountability. In
the non-profit field, one of the reasons for the increase in disclosure practices is the
heterogeneity of the information demanded by the diverse stakeholder community
(Keating and Frumkin 2003).
While this article has a theoretical foundation, we aim to provide useful results
that can verify if the number and the power of different stakeholders, in a typical
non-profit context and in absence of shareholders, really influence the levels of
internal and external accountability. A general thought about the avenue that the
international and national standardization process of museum accountability
practices can follow derives from these results.
Toward this end, the article uses the following structure. First, we analyze
stakeholder theory and accountability systems. Then, we conduct a literature review
and state our research hypotheses. Then, the dataset and method are presented. The
last section of the article discusses findings and conclusions.
Stakeholder Theory and Accountability in Museums
Museums are non-profit institutions, and their corporate governance structure does
not include shareholders. Their activity is oriented towards the interests of the
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community [see International Council of Museums (ICOM), Code of ethics,
Definition of museum], which is understood to include both present and future
generations (Gilhespy 1999 speaks about intergenerational equity). The overriding
purpose of museums is to satisfy the cultural requirements of their communities
(see: ICOM 2006; American Association of Museums 2007).
Thus, there is a sort of ‘‘social contract’’ that links the museum and the
community (Mayston 1993; Edson and Dean 1996; Lord and Lord 1991; Ambrose
and Paine 1993). The community enters into a contract with an expert in managing a
specific type of heritage (artistic, archaeological, etc.). This contract remains valid
as long as the cultural demands of stakeholders are satisfied.
This corporate governance mechanism takes the form of a multiple agency
relationship (principal–agent–agent) (Cornforth 2003; Miller 2002; Murray 1997;
Prieto-Rodrı´guez and Ferna´ndez-Blanco 2006). The community (principal)
expresses its cultural requirements through a representative (a first-level agent)
who is invested with the power to provide guidance and to coordinate and control
initiatives. This representative, then, has the task of appointing the top management
of the museum organization (second-level agents) and ensuring that they respect the
mandate that they have received from the community.
In the Anglo-Saxon world, the Trust is a perfect reflection of this type of multi-
agency relationship. The Trustee (the first-level agent) is a group of people, often
selected civil society representatives (professors, artists, lawyers, etc.) who are
given ownership of the assets in question and are obligated to preserve them for
future generations and make them available to the general public. This body
appoints the managers of the museum (the second-level agents) who implement the
cultural guidelines of the Trustee. The latter has the task of expressing the interests
of the community and ensuring that the management correctly addresses them.
Accountability facilitates the proper functioning of this system. Despite its
popularity, the concept of accountability is often misunderstood and misinterpreted,
because it is contradictory in nature, and interestingly, the term itself still has no
clear definition. Edwards and Hulme (1996, p. 967) define accountability as ‘‘the
means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or
authorities) and are held responsible for their actions.’’ Cornwall et al. (2000)
broaden this perspective by defining accountability as both a reactive response to
those who hold the organization responsible and a proactive notion of taking
responsibility voluntarily. These definitions immediately raise a fundamental
question: What precisely might an organization be accountable for, and to whom
is it accountable? For some authors, the concepts of accountability, transparency,
and trust are inseparable. In general, accountability involves both answerability and
enforceability. Ebrahim (2003a, p. 194) suggests a broader approach to account-
ability that we adopt in this paper, characterizing it as ‘‘the means through which
individuals and organizations are held externally to account for their actions, and as
the means by which they take internal responsibility for continuously shaping and
scrutinizing organizational mission, goals, and performance.’’
In this and in other definitions, the essence of accountability is answerability,
since being accountable means having the obligation to answer questions regarding
decisions, activities, and actions (Brinkerhoff 2004). Accountability is often
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identified with a duty of information provision and with the justification of the
organization activity, but its definition also relates to specifying accountability for
what and for whom.
A recent distinction in non-profit accountability literature is between ‘‘the
theoretical concepts of hierarchical accountability as a form of accountability to a
narrow range of influential stakeholders, and holistic accountability as a form of
accountability to a much broader range of stakeholders’’ (O’Dwyer and Unerman
2008, p. 803).
Hierarchical accountability is markedly instrumental and opportunistic, short
term in orientation and favors accountability to those stakeholders who control
access to key resources for both resource use and immediate (campaign) impacts
(Ebrahim 2003a, b; Edwards and Hulme 2002a, b).
The term ‘‘holistic accountability’’ refers to broader forms of accountability for
the impacts that a non-profit organization’s actions have, or can have, on a broad
range of other entities, individuals, and the environment (Edwards and Hulme
2002a; Najam 1996). For some organizations this expands the concept of
‘‘performance’’ articulated within hierarchical accountability to embrace quantita-
tive and qualitative mechanisms concerned with internal control and the grade of
mission pursuit.
Regarding this topic, scholars (Ebrahim 2005; Kearns 1996) are increasingly
stressing the need for greater ‘‘downward accountability’’ to users, the local
community and other affected constituents. Specifically, these researchers have
emphasized the need for organizations to pursue responsiveness in their account-
ability mechanisms by ensuring that governance arrangements and strategic-level
decisions are aligned with the demands of a broad range of stakeholders (Weber
1999), so confirming the emerging call for intensive stakeholder involvement in
decision-making processes as a critical dimension of organizational accountability.
Moreover, recent literature underlines the multi-dimensional nature of non-profit
accountability. According to Brinkerhoff (2004) and to Jordan and Van Tuijl
(2006), three dimensions of accountability emerge: financial, performance, and
political accountability.
First, accountability as a financial tool ‘‘concerns tracking and reporting on
allocation, disbursement, and utilization of financial resources, using the tools of
auditing, budgeting, and accounting’’ and ‘‘deals with compliance with laws, rules,
and regulations regarding financial control and management’’ (Brinkerhoff 2001,
p. 10). In other terms, financial accountability concerns tracking and reporting on
allocation and utilization of financial resources, using the tools of management
control and auditing.
Second, accountability pertaining to performance ‘‘refers to demonstrating and
accounting for performance in light of agreed-upon performance targets,’’ with its
focus on ‘‘services, outputs, and results’’ (Brinkerhoff 2001, p. 10) and is strictly
connected with organization’s mission, providing both ‘‘a verbal link between the
presumably deeply held promises and the conduct of those representing the
nonprofit’’ (Lawry 1995, p. 14) and a basis for evaluating organizational
performance (Ebrahim 2003a). In other words, performance accountability refers
654 Voluntas (2013) 24:649–665
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to demonstrating and reporting for performance in light of agreed-upon performance
targets and it focuses on inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts.
Third, political accountability, in a non-profit organization, relates to the
procedures and mechanisms that ensure the organization fulfills the public trust,
engages and involves stakeholders, responding to their legitimate expectations and
needs.
From this perspective, accountability can take a number of forms: internal or
external, formal or informal, vertical or horizontal, bottom-up or top-down (Molnar
2008, p. 219).
As organizations that the public trusts to care for shared artistic heritage,
museums must continually re-assess and re-affirm their commitment through
accountability. The community must perform a type of cost-benefit analysis,
assessing the degree to which its cultural requirements have been satisfied and
directing resources towards the museums with the highest performance. To this end,
museum performance and objectives must be made public. Essentially, the
legitimacy of a museum rests on the community’s impression of its work (Carnegie
and Wolnizer 1996; Kavanagh 1991; Anderson 2004; Bud et al. 1991).
Because the community does not possess the means to express a consummate and
binding judgment regarding the work being performed by the museum, museum
accreditation procedures have been established in some countries. The purpose of
these bodies is to determine the ‘‘quality’’ of museum processes and the extent to
which they conform to correct procedure. The codification of precise quality
standards and the design of accreditation systems are aimed to legitimize the
museum’s work for its stakeholders (American Association of Museums 1990,
2007). The level of funding is tied to the social performance of each museum
(Anderson 2004; Kavanagh 1991; West Midlands Regional Museum Council 2000).
The first accreditation models were developed for American museums in the
middle of the last century. These are schema designed by sector associations to
evaluate whether each museum has met minimum requisite performance levels.
Beginning in 1988, museum standards were introduced in the UK via a public
governmental body (the Museums and Galleries Commission). This arrangement
guarantees a greater degree of penetration than a self-disciplinary code like the
American one. Subsequently, other European countries such as Ireland, the
Netherlands, and Denmark took inspiration from this model in designing and
implementing their own accreditation systems.
Research Hypotheses
Because it is difficult to measure the number and the strength of each stakeholder,
stakeholder theory assumes that these factors increase with organization size (Gray
et al. 2006; Collier 2008, Weber 1999). Bigger organizations face many
stakeholders that are well organized and can insist on the release of information.
Moreover, larger organizations have higher agency costs (Healy and Palepu 2001).
Empirical evidence in for-profit organizations clearly confirms that disclosure
levels are positively associated with firm size (Cerf 1961; Singhvi and Desai 1971;
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Buzby 1975; Salamon and Dhaliwal 1980; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Firth 1979;
Kahl and Belkaoui 1981; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1989; Wagenhofer
1990; Wallace et al. 1994; Inchausti 1997; Hossain et al. 1995). To our knowledge,
in the non-profit field there is no such evidence.
Therefore, the first research hypothesis is as follows:
H1 The larger the museum, the more it communicates with the public.
Among stakeholders, those who are most ‘‘salient’’ are donors. Donors provide
museums with the money to operate and directly carry out the museum mission. It is
also believed that they are able to express and synthesize other stakeholder needs
(Carnegie and Wolnizer 1996; Kavanagh 1991; Anderson 2004; Bud et al. 1991;
Edson and Dean 1996; Lord and Lord 1991; Ambrose and Paine 1993).
The agency theory also gives donors an important role. Donors are considered the
better proxy for the main principal, the community (Mayston 1993). Thus, grants
and donations are seen as implicit judgments about the degree to which a museum
has satisfied cultural demands (Reiss 2000).
Thus, grants and donations are hypothesized to be more generous at high-
performing museums. Consequently, to maintain and develop donor trust, those
museums must then be more accountable. This is also required based on recent
public reforms (Thompson 2001; Rentschler and Potter 1996; Waters 2008).
This leads us to our second research hypothesis:
H2 The more funding the museum receives, the more it communicates with the
public.
Database
To study the most homogenous phenomenon possible, we have selected all of the
National Museums. Such museums have public governance structures.
Based on Wikipedia1 resources, we have selected all the National Museums in
the major developed countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the
Table 1 Selected museums by
nationality
Country No. of museums No. of observations
Australia 15 15
Canada 16 10
France 8 8
Germany 10 10
Italy 8 8
United Kingdom 52 33
United States of America 25 22
Total 134 106
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_museums.
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United Kingdom, and the US. In total, our database is comprised 134 museums
distributed among the various countries, as shown in Table 1.
All the museums selected have websites. Some (28 out of 134) are part of the
websites of their corresponding parent institutions. For this reason, there are several
museums that are listed on the same website and have the same parent institution.2
This is why the number of observations (106) is lower than the number of museums
in the sample (134).
There are 32 art museums and 74 other types of museums. Their distribution by
country is shown in Table 2.
Method
The web site of each museum (following the link shown by Wikipedia) has been
scrutinized to measure its accountability level. We have analyzed all the pages
dedicated to accountability. To do this we have conjunctively used three different
criteria:
(a) scrutinize all the pages under the specific section devoted to inform the
stakeholders—named in different ways, i.e., ‘‘stakeholder information’’,
‘‘about the museum’’, etc.—that can be found following the navigation bar
on the homepage or looking at the map of the website;
(b) examine the annual report, if available, looking at the index and using the
search tool to get the accountability information/document;
(c) use the search tool present on the homepage to get the accountability
information/document that can be transmitted on generic web pages or other
sections.
We have developed a classical disclosure index, selecting items deemed relevant
in the main literature on museum management and accountability (Ames 1994; Beer
1994; Bowsher 1999; Bud et al. 1991; Diamond 1996; Gilhespy 1999; Edson and
Dean 1996; Lord and Lord 1991; Thompson 2001). All the items are listed in
Table 2 Type of museums
selected
Art museums Other type of museums
Australia 4 11
Canada 4 6
France 2 6
Germany 4 6
Italy 7 1
United Kingdom 7 26
United States of America 4 18
Total 32 74
2 For instance, six Scottish museums are part of the same website. The same is true for eight museums in
Wales and five in Northern Ireland.
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Table 3 and divided into three classes according to the accountability literature
recalling in section ‘‘Stakeholder theory and accountability in museums’’: financial,
performance, and political accountability.
Our first step in measuring accountability levels is to record the items. We have
used a binomial logic, assigning a value of one (1) when the item is present and zero
(0) when it is absent. Then, we have calculated the arithmetic average of the scores,
which was taken to represent the accountability level of the museum (ACCOUNT).
We have thus measured accountability using a classical unweighted disclosure
index (Cooke 1989; Beattie et al. 2004).
To test the hypotheses, we use this model:
ACCOUNTi ¼ b0 þ b1SIZEi þ b2FUNDi þ b3COUNTRYi þ b4KINDi
þ b5COSTVISi þ ei ð1Þ
where SIZE is the number of visitors3 downloaded from the museum’s website or
collected from other national public surveys, FUND is the natural log of total grants
and donations4 for the last year, registered as both revenues in the profit and loss
account and increase in capital net worth in the balance sheet, COUNTRY is a
Table 3 Items from
accountability index
Financial accountability
Financial statement
Account notes
Management commentary
Auditor report
Performance accountability
Vision/mission statement
Governance structure
Human resource organization
Strategic plan
Results of research activities
Key performance indicators
Risk report
Visitor survey
Results of educational activities
Political accountability
President/director statement
Management of collections and acquisition of works of arts
Voluntary work report
Management remunerations
Report on donations and benefactors
3 We also tried to represent SIZE using total cost or revenues, but these variables appear to be strictly
correlated with the variable FUND.
4 Natural log transformation is used to reduce the skewness of the data set (Hossain et al. 1995).
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dummy variable representing legal and cultural origin (1, Anglo-Saxon; 0, other),
KIND is a dummy variable representing the type of activity (1, art; 0, other),
COSTVIS is the natural log of the cost per visitor. This variable has been calculated
by dividing the total cost registered in the profit and loss account for the last year by
the number of visitors (SIZE).
Different cultural and regulation environments may influence the level of
museum accountability (La Porta et al. 1998; Vanstraelen et al. 2003). For this
reason, museum country was chosen as a control variable.
Moreover, art museums are a key tourist attraction, and this may influence
accountability (Reiss 2000). Thus, our second control variable is the type of activity
carried out by the museum.
Finally, the last control variable chosen is based on signalling theory (Spence
1974). It is plausible that organizations that invest more in ‘‘typical’’ activities
(conservation of collections and their promotion) are more interested in releasing
this data.
Results
On average, the level of accountability is 0.60 (Table 4). This means that more than
11 of the 18 items that we considered are present on the websites of these
organizations. Thus, accountability practices seem to be fairly well developed in the
museum sector. Moreover, these practices are quite homogeneous among museums,
as indicated by the standard deviation (0.31).
Mandatory documents are not always present (Table 5). Greater attention is
assigned to the governance structure and vision/mission statement. There is a
general lack of communication about performance (results of research activities,
key performance indicators, risk report, results of educational activities).
The statistics for our independent variables are summarized in Table 6. The
average number of visitors is 1,888,734, and the standard deviation of the sample is
relatively high. The average amount of funding received by any one museum is
approximately 15 million dollars.
We estimate Eq. 1 using an OLS multivariate model (the distribution is normal).5
The Pearson correlations reported in Table 7 suggest that multicollinearity is
unlikely to invalidate the model.
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for ACCOUNT
Mean SD IQ Median IIIQ Min Max
0.60 0.31 0.43 0.72 0.80 0.11 1
5 The General Linear Model (GLM) was used to fit the data based on the characteristics of the dependent
variables. The GLM analysis yields similar results. Hence, we conclude that the results are not sensitive to
the estimation technique used.
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Table 8 shows that our model is quite strong, explaining more than 45% of the
total variability with a significant p value for the F-statistic. The coefficient signs
confirm our expectations.
Size is significant, as is the amount of funds received. These results confirm both
of our hypotheses.
Table 5 Mean of items of
ACCOUNT
Items Mean
Financial accountability
Financial statement 0.83
Account notes 0.61
Management commentary 0.51
Auditor report 0.71
Performance accountability
Vision/mission statement 0.91
Governance structure 0.92
Human resource organization 0.77
Strategic plan 0.39
Results of research activities 0.21
Key performance indicators 0.15
Risk report 0.24
Visitor survey 0.71
Results of educational activities 0.31
Political accountability
President/director statement 0.86
Management of collections and acquisition of works of arts 0.84
Voluntary work report 0.54
Management remunerations 0.43
Report on donations and benefactors 0.77
Table 6 Descriptive statistics for SIZE and FUND
Mean SD IQ Median IIIQ Min Max
SIZE 1,888,734 2,169,075 430,627 903,188 2,117,604 41,365 8,260,000
FUND 15,343,462 20,716,348 1,600,500 5,785,491 20,831,750 12,766 78,989,000
Table 7 Pearson correlation
matrix
FUND COSTVIS SIZE
FUND 1
COSTVIS -0.0197313 1
SIZE 0.37044472 -0.20008564 1
Y 0.44117825 0.15375862 0.5193999
660 Voluntas (2013) 24:649–665
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Conclusions
Stakeholder theory posits that accountability systems depend on the strength and
number of the stakeholders in question. To analyze the empirical validity of this
assumption, we focus on museums. Museums are a specific type of non-profit
organization that lacks shareholders. Additionally, museums’ lack of emphasis on
profit should make stakeholder relationships more manifest.
As organizations that the community (the principal) trusts to care for artistic
heritage, museums (agents) must continually re-assess and re-affirm their commit-
ment through accountability.
Because it is difficult to measure the number and the strength of each stakeholder,
stakeholder theory assumes that these variables increase with organization size. This
is the first hypothesis that we tested. Second, the more ‘‘salient’’ stakeholders in
museums are donors. Thus, because they must maintain and develop donor trust, the
museums that receive larger grants and donations are assumed to be more
accountable. This is our second research hypothesis.
We analyzed a specific external accountability channel: web communication, the
most important channel for a general stakeholder.
Using Wikipedia, we have examined all the National Museums in the major
developed countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and the US. Our database is composed of 134 museums.
We developed a classical unweighted disclosure index composed of 18 items
following the main studies on museum management and accountability.
After controlling for type of activity, cost per visitor, and country, our OLS
results show that size and the amount of funding received are two determinants of
the accountability level. These results confirm our hypotheses.
We can thus conclude that accountability in the absence of shareholders is driven
by the number and power of different stakeholders. This validates the stakeholder–
agency theory.
From a practical point of view, our results advocate that national and
international standard-setters use caution in issuing accountability standards for
museums. In fact, accountability practices for smaller museums are not well
Table 8 Regression model for
ACCOUNT
Signif codes: ** p \ 0.01,
* p \ 0.05
Estimate Pr([|t|)
Coefficients
(Intercept) 0.264831 0.3527
SIZE 0.011619 0.00835**
FUND 0.025081 0.03759*
COSTVIS 0.00121 0.38044
KIND -0.05632 0.28294
COUNTRY 0.040462 0.33914
F-statistic 3.575, p = 0.008385*
Adjusted R2 = 0.4572
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developed. A general request that all museums attain high standards might cause
small museums to incur great costs. Perhaps a simplifier set of standards might be
developed for small museums (see IFRS for smaller firms). Furthermore, to improve
the communication of performance results, greater attention could be directed
toward those accountability tools, as called for in the main literature on museum
management.
Our database is not representative of the overall museum population because we
have focused only on National Museums, which possess certain peculiarities.
Our accountability index has certain limitations. First, the data-gathering process
based on a binomial logic has the advantage of being fair, objective, and simple.
This method, however, does not take into consideration the quality of the reporting
activity. Furthermore, when attributing the same weight to each item (arithmetic
mean) to obtain a global score, one does not take into consideration the unique role
and importance of each item for users. Unfortunately, there are no studies on the
interest of stakeholders in each type of information.
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